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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Eagle Environmental, L.P. ("Eagle"), a landfill developer, 
brought both facial and as-applied challenges against a 
federal statute regulating the placement of waste disposal 
facilities near airports. The District Court struck down the 
law as facially unconstitutional, holding that it was so 
irrationally underinclusive as to violate equal pr otection. 
 
While this appeal was pending, Congress r epealed the 
challenged statute and replaced it with a substantially 
broader regulatory scheme. We believe that this action has 
mooted Eagle's claims regarding the old statute's facial 
constitutionality, and accordingly vacate that portion of the 
 
                                3 
  
District Court's judgment. As to Eagle's as-applied 
challenges, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants. 
 
I. 
 
A. The Happy Landing Landfill 
 
The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute. 
Khodara Environmental, Inc., is the general partner of 
Eagle, a limited partnership based in Englewood Clif fs, New 
Jersey. Eagle owns approximately 680 acr es in Jefferson 
County, Pennsylvania, on which it planned to develop a 
solid waste disposal facility to be called the Happy Landing 
Landfill. Happy Landing was intended to accept municipal 
waste from primarily out-of-state producers. The Happy 
Landing site is located approximately 5.25 miles from the 
Dubois-Jefferson County Airport. 
 
In 1990, Eagle began applying for the necessary landfill 
permits from the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection ("PDEP"). 1 The PDEP initially 
issued all four of the permits necessary for the construction 
and operation of Happy Landing. After obtaining these 
permits, Eagle began pre-construction by conducting 
engineering surveys and installing monitoring wells. 
 
In September 1996, however, the Pennsylvania Fish and 
Boat Commission designated three streams near the Happy 
Landing site as wild trout streams. Based on this 
designation, the PDEP determined that the landfill site 
contained wetlands of "exceptional value" and that it 
consequently should not have issued to Eagle the W ater 
Obstruction and Encroachment Permit tofill these wetland 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Under Pennsylvania law, before construction and operation of a 
landfill may commence, the prospective operator must obtain the 
necessary permits from the PDEP, including: a permit to authorize the 
construction and operation of the landfill; a per mit to authorize the 
discharge of treated industrial waste; a permit to authorize certain air 
emissions related to the landfill's operation; and, if the proposed 
construction adversely affects wetlands, a W ater Obstruction and 
Encroachment Permit. 
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areas. Accordingly, on September 25, 1996, Steven 
Beckman, the Regional Director of the Northwest Regional 
Office of the PDEP, entered an administrative order 
modifying Eagle's Water Obstruction and Encr oachment 
Permit by revoking its authorization tofill certain wetland 
areas. The order also suspended the r emainder of that 
permit, as well as all of Eagle's other per mits. Eagle 
appealed the revocation and suspension or der to the 
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Boar d. The Board 
denied Eagle's appeal, and the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court, in an Order filed on February 19, 
2000, affirmed. See Khodara Envir onmental, L.P. v. 
Department of Environmental Protection , No. 2704 C.D. 1998 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 19, 2000). Eagle's appeal of the 
Commonwealth Court's order is currently pending, and 
construction of Happy Landing has been suspended until 
this controversy is resolved. 
 
B. The 1996 Amendment 
 
On October 9, 1996, Congress enacted the Federal 
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 
110 Stat. 3213. Section 1220 of the Act (the "1996 
Amendment") was drafted by Representatives Bud Schuster 
and William Clinger--whose Pennsylvania districts 
encompass Jefferson County and neighboring ar eas--and 
was inserted into the Act during a conference committee 
convened to debate an unrelated amendment. The 1996 
Amendment provided: 
 
       (a) Landfills: [49 U.S.C.] Section 44718 is amended by 
       adding at the end the following: 
 
       (d) Landfills: For the purpose of enhancing aviation 
       safety, in a case in which 2 landfills have been 
       proposed to be constructed or established within 
       6 miles of a commercial service airport with 
       fewer than 50,000 enplanements per year, no 
       person shall construct or establish either landfill 
       if an official of the Federal Aviation 
       Administration has stated in writing within the 
       3-year period ending on the date of the 
       enactment that 1 of the landfills would be 
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       incompatible with aircraft operations at the 
       airport, unless the landfill is already active on 
       the such date of enactment or the airport 
       operator agrees to the construction or 
       establishment of the landfill. 
 
       (b) Civil Penalties: [49 U.S.C.] Section 46301 is 
       amended by inserting 44718(d) after 44716, in 
       each of subsections (a)(1)(A), (d)(2), and (f)(1)(A)(i). 
 
Pub. L. No. 104-264, S 1220(a), 110 Stat. 3213, 3286. 
Eagle's proposed landfill fell within the statutory criteria. 
Both Happy Landing and a second proposed waste disposal 
facility, the Leatherwood Landfill,2  were located within six 
miles of the DuBois-Jefferson County Airport, a commercial 
airport with fewer than 50,000 enplanements per year . 
Moreover, the FAA had issued a written determination 
within the preceding three years that the Leatherwood 
facility would be incompatible with aircraft operations at 
the Airport.3 In fact, as the F AA has admitted on appeal, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In January 1991, Leatherwood, Inc., submitted a request to the PDEP 
for permission to operate the Leatherwood Landfill near the Dubois- 
Jefferson County Airport. 
 
3. Leatherwood's proposed site was located within five miles of the 
Airport and beneath the approach course of a runway. The FAA 
concluded that this configuration would significantly increase the risk of 
an aircraft bird strike and accordingly recommended that the PDEP deny 
Leatherwood's permit application under a 1990 FAA regulation, which 
classified the following landfill placements as incompatible with air 
safety: 
 
       a. Waste disposal sites located within 10,000 feet of any runway 
       end used or planned to be used by turbine power ed aircraft. 
 
       b. Waste disposal sites located within 5,000 feet of any runway end 
       used only by piston powered aircraft. 
 
       c. Any waste disposal site located within a 5 mile radius of a 
       runway end that attracts or sustains hazardous bird movements 
       from feeding, water or roosting ar eas into, or across the runways 
       and/or approach and departure patter ns of aircraft. 
 
(App. 2:196.) Because Happy Landing was located 5.25 miles away from 
the Airport, however, it was not subject to F AA regulation prior to the 
passage of the 1996 Amendment. 
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the 1996 Amendment's extremely narrow criteria affected 
only Happy Landing, out of all the landfills in the country.4 
 
On October 21, 1996, PDEP Regional Director Beckman 
sent a letter to Eagle informing it that the 1996 
Amendment "impacts the two proposed landfills in 
Jefferson County, Eagle Environmental's Happy Landing 
Landfill and Leatherwood, Inc.'s Jefferson Landfill." (App. 
1:51.) The letter went on to explain that all of the permits 
previously issued for the Leatherwood landfill had been 
suspended in light of the new law. The letter further 
advised that 
 
       [t]he Department's further action regar ding 
       reinstatement and/or modification of Eagle 
       Environmental's currently suspended per mits will be 
       governed by the same criteria applicable to 
       Leatherwood, Inc. Thus, if Eagle seeks reinstatement or 
       modification pursuant to the Department's September 
       25th Order, Eagle Environmental should also indicate 
       to the Department how it intends to comply with 
       Section 1220(a) of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization 
       Act of 1996. 
 
(App. 1:51.) 
 
On November 20, 1996, Eagle, acting pursuant to the 
new statutory scheme, formally sought per mission from the 
Clearfield-Jefferson Counties Regional Airport Authority 
(the "Airport Authority")5 to construct and operate the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The 1996 Amendment's legislative history suggests that it was 
intended to single out Happy Landing for regulation. After the Act was 
signed into law, Rep. Shuster, the pr ovision's drafter, issued a press 
release titled "SHUSTER AUTHORS PROVISION TO PROTECT DUBOIS 
JEFFERSON COUNTY AIRPORT FROM LANDFILL," in which he stated 
that "[m]y provision allows the local airport authority to stop these 
landfills." (App. 3:497-98.) Another newspaper article quoted Rep. 
Shuster as stating that the Amendment was enacted to enable the local 
Airport Authority to block the landfill and that"[t]here's only one 
airport 
in the United States that fits [the Amendment's] definition." (App. 
3:500.) 
Commenting on the possibility of a legal challenge by Eagle, Rep. 
Shuster stated that "if they go into court, you could tie them up for 
years 
and years and years." (App. 3:500.) 
 
5. The Authority is a municipal authority for med under the laws of 
Pennsylvania, and is entirely responsible for the operation of the Dubois- 
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landfill. On November 22, the Authority responded with a 
letter notifying Eagle that it would accept written 
documentation supporting Eagle's request for a period of 30 
days. The Authority also informed Eagle that it would 
accept documentation from other interested parties over the 
same period and that all the submissions it r eceived would 
be made public. On December 23, 1996, Eagle pr ovided the 
Authority with 14 exhibits in support of its r equest. At a 
public meeting held on January 24, 1997, the Authority's 
Board of Directors unanimously denied Eagle's request. 
 
C. The District Court Litigation 
 
On April 25, 1997, Eagle filed the present action in the 
United States District Court for the Wester n District of 
Pennsylvania. Eagle's first three claims, which involved 
facial constitutional challenges to the 1996 Amendment, 
were asserted against the FAA, as well as against Barry 
Valentine (the Acting Administrator of the F AA)6 and Steven 
Beckman (the Regional Director of the PDEP) in their 
official capacities.7 Count I of the Complaint alleged that 
the 1996 Amendment worked an unconstitutional 
delegation of federal authority to the local airport authority; 
Count II attacked the Amendment as an unconstitutional 
bill of attainder; and Count III challenged the law on the 
ground that it violated Eagle's rights to equal protection 
and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Count IV of the Complaint was dir ected 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Jefferson County Airport. The Authority, acting through its Board of 
Directors, is generally responsible for making decisions concerning the 
administration of the Airport, including operations, airport safety, and 
capital improvements. 
 
6. On August 4, 1997, Jane F. Garvey was appointed FAA Administrator. 
Garvey was substituted as a defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 25(d)(1). 
 
7. In its Complaint, Eagle originally asserted these claims against the 
Airport Authority and its directors as well. The District Court, however, 
held that the Airport Authority defendants wer e not proper parties to 
Eagle's facial challenges to the 1996 Amendment, and Eagle has not 
appealed this ruling. 
 
                                8 
  
against the Airport Authority and its directors 8 in their 
individual and official capacities. This count asserted that 
defendants' application of the 1996 Amendment violated 
Eagle's constitutional rights to equal protection, procedural 
and substantive due process, and freedom from the taking 
of property without just compensation. Finally, Count V, 
which Eagle asserted against all defendants, claimed that 
the 1996 Amendment did not apply to Happy Landing as a 
matter of statutory construction. Eagle sought declaratory 
judgment on all counts, as well as prospective injunctive 
relief and compensatory and punitive damages. In addition 
to the previously mentioned parties, the District Court 
granted Jefferson County and Pine Creek T ownship 
permission to participate as intervenors in the case. 
 
On May 16, 1997, defendant Beckman filed a motion to 
dismiss the case, arguing that Eagle lacked standing and 
that the case was not ripe. Specifically, Beckman argued 
that Eagle could not demonstrate any injury arising from 
the PDEP's letter of October 21, 1996, because, when the 
letter was issued, Happy Landing's construction had 
already been forestalled by the suspension of Eagle's state 
permits. On September 23, 1997, the District Court denied 
Beckman's motion, holding that a ruling on the 
constitutionality of the 1996 Amendment would per mit 
Eagle to make an informed decision on whether to expend 
additional effort to pursue its appeal on the state permits. 
Moreover, the court held that the PDEP had not foresworn 
its intention to enforce the 1996 Amendment should Eagle's 
permits be restored in its state court litigation. 
 
Eagle subsequently filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment as to Counts I, II, and III of its Complaint--the 
facial constitutional challenges. The FAA and the 
intervenors cross-moved for summary judgment on the 
same counts. The Airport Authority and its Boar d members 
moved for summary judgment as to Counts IV and V . 
Beckman filed a motion in which he renewed his previous 
arguments concerning standing and ripeness, and further 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Airport Authority's directors during the relevant period were Don 
Johnson, Paul Sekula, William Miksich, Mark McKinley, Frederick 
Murray, Tim Morgan, Robert Reitz, Henry Deible and Paul McMillen. 
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argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on the 
basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The intervenors 
also moved to dismiss on the grounds of mootness and lack 
of ripeness. 
 
On April 1, 1999, the District Court entered its final 
judgment and order. See Khodara Environmental, Inc. v. 
Beckman, 91 F. Supp. 2d 827 (W.D. Pa. 1999). At the 
outset, the Court rejected the jurisdictional defenses raised 
by Beckman and the intervenors and held that the 1996 
Amendment, as a matter of statutory construction, applied 
to Happy Landing. Turning to Eagle's constitutional 
challenges, the Court held that the 1996 Amendment was 
facially unconstitutional because it violated Eagle's right to 
equal protection. Although the Court found that the 
government had a legitimate interest in preventing aircraft 
bird strikes, it found several aspects of the statute so 
grossly under- and over-inclusive as to render the statutory 
classification irrational. In particular, the Court saw no 
rational justification for the provisions that: (1) limited the 
ban to cases where exactly two landfills had been proposed; 
(2) restricted the provision to airports with less than 50,000 
annual emplanements; (3) covered only commer cial, and 
not commuter, airports; and (4) limited the statute to purely 
retrospective effect. In short, the Court found it irrational to 
single out the Leatherwood and Happy Landing Landfills for 
regulation, while permitting the operation of other similarly 
situated landfills across the country. Because it held the 
Amendment unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, 
the Court did not find it necessary to addr ess Eagle's bill of 
attainder or non-delegation challenges. Finally, the Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Airport 
Authority and its directors with respect to Eagle's "as 
applied" constitutional claims (Count IV). 
 
The FAA and Beckman appealed the Court's 
determination that the 1996 Amendment was facially 
unconstitutional. Eagle cross-appealed the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Airport Authority 
defendants on Count IV. 
 
D. The 2000 Amendment 
 
This Court took up the appeals and heard oral argument. 
After oral argument, but before we had issued a judgment, 
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Congress enacted legislation substantially modifying the 
1996 Amendment. On April 5, 2000, the President signed 
into law the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and 
Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 
Stat. 61 (2000). Section 503 of the Act (the "2000 
Amendment") amended 49 U.S.C. S 44718(d) to read as 
follows: 
 
       (d) LIMITATION ON CONSTRUCTION OF LANDFILLS. 
       -- 
 
       (1) IN GENERAL.--No person shall construct or 
       establish a municipal solid waste landfill (as defined 
       in section 258.2 of title 40, Code of Federal 
       Regulations, as in effect on the date of the enactment 
       of this subsection) that receives putrescible waste (as 
       defined in section 257.3-8 of such title) within 6 
       miles of a public airport that has received grants 
       under chapter 471 and is primarily served by general 
       aviation aircraft and regularly scheduledflights of 
       aircraft designed for 60 passengers or less unless the 
       State aviation agency of the State in which the 
       airport is located requests that the Administrator of 
       the Federal Aviation Administration exempt the 
       landfill from the application of this subsection and 
       the Administrator determines that such exemption 
       would have no adverse impact on aviation safety. 
 
       (2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY .--Paragraph (1) 
       shall not apply in the State of Alaska and shall not 
       apply to the construction, establishment, expansion, 
       or modification of, or to any other activity 
       undertaken with respect to, a municipal solid waste 
       landfill if the construction or establishment of the 
       landfill was commenced on or before the date of the 
       enactment of this subsection. 
 
Pub. L. No. 106-181, S 503, 114 Stat. 61, 133. 
 
The 2000 Amendment significantly broadened the scope 
of the statute, thus resolving many of the District Court's 
equal protection concerns. Unlike the challenged law, the 
new statutory scheme does not work to single out the 
Happy Landing site for exceptional treatment. In essence, 
the amended statute creates a purely pr ospective six-mile 
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"safety zone" around all federally-funded (non-Alaskan) 
airports with regularly scheduled flights of 60 passengers or 
less. The amended statute also alleviates the non-delegation 
and separation-of-powers concerns raised by the old law. 
Before the District Court, Eagle argued that the 1996 
Amendment's grant of exemption power to local airport 
authorities violated Article I's requir ement of unitary 
executive power. The amended statute, in contrast, grants 
no statutory power to local authorities. Rather , the final 
power to make exceptions is granted to the Administrator of 
the FAA, who is an agent of the federal executive. 
 
In light of the 2000 Amendment, the FAA hasfiled a 
motion pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 27.4 to vacate the 
District Court's judgment as moot and remand. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
We turn first to the FAA's claim of mootness. Article III of 
the Constitution grants the federal courts the power to 
adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or contr oversies. 
"This case-or-controversy requir ement subsists through all 
stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate." 
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); 
see also U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994); Ivy Club v. Edwards, 
943 F.2d 270, 275 (3d Cir. 1991). Our mootness 
determination therefore turns on whether there remains, in 
light of Congress's action, "a real and substantial 
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of 
conclusive character." New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. 
Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc. , 101 F.3d 1492, 1496 
(3d Cir. 1996) (quoting National Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco 
Int'l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir . 1992)). 
 
We agree that the passage of the 2000 Amendment has 
mooted Eagle's facial constitutional challenges to the 1996 
Amendment. Under the circumstances present here, we 
must "review the judgment of the district court in light of 
the [the] law as it now stands, not as it stood when the 
judgment below was entered." Dif fenderfer v. Central Baptist 
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Church, 404 U.S. 412, 414 (1972); see also Princeton Univ. 
v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103 (1982) (per curiam); Naturist 
Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992); 
Black United Fund of New Jersey, Inc. v. Kean, 763 F.2d 
156, 160 (3d Cir. 1985). Black United Fund is instructive. In 
that case, the plaintiff charity challenged a New Jersey 
statute permitting the United Way--but not other charitable 
organizations--to deduct voluntary contributions from the 
salaries of government workers. The District Court found 
the statute unconstitutionally discriminatory and enjoined 
its operation. Pending appeal, the state repealed the 
challenged law and replaced it with a new statute that 
permitted voluntary payroll deductions for other charities 
that met specified criteria. We held that the statutory 
amendment mooted plaintiff 's claims: 
 
       We conclude, therefore, that the r epeal of the 1955 
       statute and the enactment of new legislation make it 
       inappropriate for us to affirm the district court's order 
       based on alleged deficiencies in the old Act. The raison 
       d'etre for the injunction no longer exists. 
 
Black United Fund, 763 F.2d at 160. Moreover, we found 
that the new legislation had substantially r esolved the 
constitutional questions raised by the predecessor law: 
 
       [W]e note that the new Act has enlarged the group of 
       charitable organizations which may have access to 
       state facilities and establishes criteria which govern 
       eligibility. The legislation thus meets at least two of the 
       objections cited by the district court--the exclusivity 
       granted the United Way and the lack of standards for 
       determining which other groups may participate. . . . 
       To that extent, the new Act will give plaintif f 
       substantially the relief it sought in the district court. 
 
Id. at 160-61. 
 
Similar concerns inform our mootness decision here. The 
scope of the 2000 Amendment is substantially br oader than 
that of the challenged law. The restrictive criteria and 
purely retrospective nature of the old statute--which the 
District Court found irrationally underinclusive--effectively 
limited its application only to the Happy Landing and 
Leatherwood landfills. The new provision, however, applies 
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prospectively to a wide variety of landfills. Accordingly, we 
believe that the 2000 Amendment is far less susceptible to 
attack on equal protection or bill-of-attainder grounds. 
Moreover, the new law places the power to make 
exemptions in the hands of the FAA rather than the local 
airport authority, thereby assuaging Eagle's unitary 
executive concerns. 
 
Simply put, a declaration of unconstitutionality or 
injunction directed against the objectionable features of the 
1996 Amendment would serve no purpose today. "Where a 
law is amended so as to remove its challenged features, the 
claim . . . becomes moot as to those features." Naturist 
Soc'y, 958 F.2d at 1520; see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of 
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 234 (1990). 
 
Nor do Eagle's facial challenges fall within any r ecognized 
exception to the mootness doctrine. In City of Mesquite v. 
Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982), the 
Supreme Court held that "a defendant's voluntary cessation 
of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of 
its power to determine the legality of the practice." Such 
cases may fall within the mootness exception of injuries 
that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514 
(1911). We do not believe that this cir cumstance is present 
here, however. As the Fourth Cir cuit has recently noted, 
"statutory changes that discontinue a challenged practice 
are `usually enough to render a case moot, even if the 
legislature possesses the power to reenact the statute after 
the lawsuit is dismissed.' " Valer o Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 
211 F.3d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Native Village of 
Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994)); 
see also National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 
108 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("the mere power to 
reenact a challenged law is not a sufficient basis on which 
a court can conclude that a reasonable expectation of 
recurrence exists"). In this case,"[w]e have no grounds for 
suspecting that [Congress] would attempt to reenact the 
prior law." Thomas v. Fielder, 884 F .2d 990, 995-96 (7th 
Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we hold that Counts I, II and III of 
Eagle's Complaint--its facial attacks on the 
constitutionality of the 1996 Amendment--ar e moot in light 
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of that law's repeal and replacement by the 2000 
Amendment. 
 
B. 
 
We next address whether the District Court's holding that 
the 1996 Amendment was facially unconstitutional is 
subject to vacatur. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 2106, we have 
the power to vacate the judgment of a district court on 
appeal. In arguing for vacatur, the F AA cites cases following 
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950), 
which held that "[t]he established practice .. . in dealing 
with a civil case from a court in the federal system which 
has become moot while on its way here or pending our 
decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment 
below and remand with a direction to dismiss." 
 
The Supreme Court, however, has explained that 
Munsingwear does not set forth a categorical rule. In U.S. 
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 
18, 23-25 (1994), the Court clarified that vacatur is an 
equitable remedy rather than an automatic right. See, e.g., 
National Black Police, 108 F.3d at 346; Humphreys v. Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 105 F.3d 112, 113-14 (3d Cir. 
1996) ("Munsingwear should not be applied blindly, but 
only after a consideration of the equities and the underlying 
reasons for mootness."). In particular , U.S. Bancorp 
emphasized that when mootness results fr om the voluntary 
action of the party seeking relief from the judgment below, 
vacatur should not be granted unless doing so would serve 
the public interest. See U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25-29. In 
such cases, the Court explained, the public inter est in a 
robust corpus of judicial precedent nor mally outweighs the 
party's interest in relief from the judgment, "the losing 
party having voluntarily forfeited his legal r emedy by the 
ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby 
surrendering his claim to the equitable r emedy of vacatur." 
Id. at 29. "Thus, absent unusual circumstances, the 
appellate vacatur decision under Bancorp is informed 
almost entirely, if not entirely, by the twin considerations of 
fault and public interest." Valero Terrestrial, 211 F.3d at 
118. 
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U.S. Bancorp refused vacatur in a case in which the 
losing party below mooted the action by settling pending 
appeal. Today, we must decide whether this same 
presumption against vacatur is appropriate when a 
governmental appeal is mooted by legislative amendment. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
recently addressed this same question, and we find its 
reasoning persuasive: 
 
       Clearly, the passage of new legislation repr esents 
       voluntary action, and thus on its face the Bancorp 
       presumption might seem to govern. W e believe, 
       however, that application of the Bancorp  presumption 
       in this context is not required by the Bancorp opinion's 
       rationale and would be inappropriate, at least if there 
       is no evidence indicating that the legislation was 
       enacted in order to overturn an unfavorable precedent. 
       The rationale underlying the Bancorp pr esumption is 
       that litigants should not be able to manipulate the 
       judicial system by "roll[ing] the dice. . . in the district 
       court" and then "wash[ing] away" any"unfavorable 
       outcome" through use of settlement and vacatur. The 
       mere fact that a legislature has enacted legislation that 
       moots an appeal, without more, provides no grounds 
       for assuming that the legislature was motivated by 
       such a manipulative purpose. The legislature may act 
       out of reasons totally independent of the pending 
       lawsuit, or because the lawsuit has convinced it that 
       the existing law is flawed. 
 
National Black Police, 108 F.3d at 351-52; see also Valero 
Terrestrial, 211 F.3d at 120 (U.S. Bancorp counsels vacatur 
where challenge is rendered moot by state's amendment of 
challenged statute). 
 
Eagle nevertheless argues that the recor d in this case 
militates against vacatur, because the F AA "is a knowing 
beneficiary of a legislative change backed by an illegitimate 
motive--i.e., to frustrate an unfavorable judgment." We 
cannot agree. Mindful of the fact that "legislative actions 
are presumptively legitimate," we ar e "wary of impugning 
the motivations that underlie a legislature's actions." 
National Black Police, 108 F.3d at 352. Eagle's claim of 
"persistent misuse of the legislative process" rings hollow. 
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There is no suggestion that Congress failed to follow 
constitutionally prescribed procedur es in passing the 2000 
Amendment. And, although Eagle argues that Congress's 
actions represent an attempt to frustrate an adverse 
judgment, the new legislation could just as cr edibly be 
viewed as a commendable effort "to r epair what may have 
been a constitutionally defective statute." American Library 
Ass'n v. Bar, 956 F.2d 1178, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In 
short, Eagle has presented no evidence to indicate that the 
2000 Amendment represents "manipulation of the 
legislative process" rather than "r esponsible lawmaking." Id. 
 
Accordingly, we believe that equity would best be served 
by vacating the District Court's judgment as to the facial 
unconstitutionality of the 1996 Amendment.9 
 
C. 
 
Eagle's as-applied constitutional claims against the 
Airport Authority and its directors, however , require a 
different analysis. Pursuant to the 1996 Amendment, Eagle 
requested that the Authority approve construction and 
operation of Happy Landing. Count IV of Eagle's Complaint 
alleged that the Authority and its directors, in denying that 
request, violated Eagle's rights to procedural and 
substantive due process, equal protection, and freedom 
from taking without just compensation. The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on 
these claims, and on appeal, Eagle contests that District 
Court's decision with respect to the pr ocedural and 
substantive due process claims. 
 
We do not believe that the passage of the 2000 
Amendment has mooted these claims. Unlike Eagle's facial 
constitutional challenges, which sought only pr ospective 
declaratory and injunctive relief,10  the due process claims 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In so doing, we do not express any view as to the correctness of the 
District Court's ruling on Eagle's equal protection claim regarding the 
1996 Amendment or as to the validity of any of Eagle's other facial 
challenges. 
 
10. We recognize that Eagle's Complaint, on its face, includes a prayer 
for compensatory and punitive damages as to each of its facial 
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set out in Count IV sought damages against the Authority 
and its members. "A case is saved from mootness if a viable 
claim for damages exists." National Iranian , 983 F.2d at 
489. In Phillips v. Borough of Caper ed, 107 F.3d 164, 177 
(3d Cir. 1997) (en banc), we held that the substitution of a 
new, less restrictive adult bookstore or dinance for the 
previous, more restrictive one did not moot plaintiffs' 
S 1983 damages claim arising out of the application of the 
prior ordinance. Similarly, in Ransom v. Maoris, 848 F.2d 
398 (3d Cir. 1988), where plaintif fs challenged municipal 
sewer and water service regulations, we held: 
 
       The plaintiffs further attempt to avoid the mooting of 
       their procedural due process claims by asserting that 
       the publication of new regulations, even if they now 
       satisfy the due process notice requir ements, does not 
       answer their claim of damages due to a deprivation of 
       notice prior to their publication and resulting from the 
       imperfection of liens. The plaintiffs ar e correct in their 
       contention that the issuance of the new regulations 
       does not moot this damage claim based on the alleged 
       constitutional notice defect prior to their publication. 
 
Id. at 410; see also Naturist Soc'y, 958 F.2d at 1519 ("the 
claim for damages saves from mootness the Society's 
contention that the `old' park regulations were 
unconstitutional as applied to it"). Eagle's claim for 
damages for the past application of the 1996 Amendment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
challenges. (App. 31, 33, 34.) In its supplemental briefing on the 
mootness issue, however, Eagle admits that it has abandoned its 
damages claims on these counts and at summary judgment only sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the F AA and Beckman: 
 
       Eagle sued the FAA, in the person of Jane Harvey, and Steven 
       Beckman in their official capacities only, and did not seek damages 
       in conjunction with their actions. In Counts I, II and III, Eagle 
       sought to have the [1996 Amendment] declar ed unconstitutional (on 
       equal protection, bill of attainder or non-delegation grounds) and 
the 
       FAA and Beckman enjoined from applying or enforcing it against 
       Eagle. 
 
Eagle Letter Brief, May 24, 2000, at 2-3 (emphasis in original; citations 
omitted). 
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invests it with a continuing, concrete stake in the outcome 
of this litigation that has not been redr essed by the passage 
of the 2000 Amendment. Therefore, we will address these 
claims on the merits. 
 
III. 
 
We first consider Eagle's procedural due process claim. 
Eagle complains that, although it was given the opportunity 
to submit documentation in support of its application, it 
was not given a chance "to review all infor mation received 
by the Airport Authority and to submit responsive 
comments." Khodara Reply Br. at 12. Eagle also complains 
that it received no hearing before its application was 
denied. Id. at 11. 
 
The procedures followed by the Airport Authority were 
not exemplary, but Pennsylvania law provided an avenue 
for Eagle to contest the Authority's action. Under 2 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 752, "[a]ny person aggrieved by an 
adjudication of a local agency who has a dir ect interest in 
such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom 
to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or 
pursuant to Title 42 . . . ." The Airport Authority falls 
within the definition of a "local agency,"11 and therefore 
Eagle could have challenged the Authority's decision in the 
state court system. 
 
We need not decide here whether these pr ocedures would 
be constitutionally sufficient if a favorable decision by the 
Airport Authority would have enabled Eagle to begin 
operation of the landfill immediately or within a short time 
thereafter. Here, on September 25, 1996--almost four 
months before the Airport Authority's adverse action--the 
PDEP suspended Eagle's construction permits for Happy 
Landing because the proposed site contained pr otected 
wetlands. Both the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. A "local agency" is "[a] gover nment agency other than a 
Commonwealth Agency." 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 101. The Clearfield- 
Jefferson County Regional Airport Authority was created under 53 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 47493. It is plainly a government agency but not an 
agency of the Commonwealth itself. 
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Board and a state court have upheld this suspension, 
which continues in effect pending Eagle's latest appeal. 
Consequently, even if the Airport Authority had granted 
Eagle permission to construct the landfill pursuant to the 
1996 Amendment, Eagle would have been unable to do so 
because of the suspension of the construction per mits. 
Under these circumstances, the availability of review under 
2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 752 satisfied due process. Cf. 
Cohen v. City of Philadelphia, 736 F.2d 88, 86 (3d Cir. 
1984)(state may provide adequate due pr ocess when it 
provides " `reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error 
by a local administrative body' ") (citation omitted). 
"[I]dentification of the specific dictates of [procedural] due 
process requires consideration of thr ee distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be af fected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedur es used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute pr ocedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In this case, although Eagle had 
a substantial interest in the development of its property as 
a landfill, Eagle could not have developed the pr operty for 
this landfill use until it obtained the necessary permits 
from the PDEP. While Eagle was attempting to obtain those 
permits, it could have contested the action of the Airport 
Authority in the state courts. Thus, as a practical matter, 
the adverse effects during the relevant time period of the 
Airport Authority's action were not substantial. Similarly, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Eagle's property 
interest in any practical sense was not gr eat. And because 
Eagle presumably could have obtained state court review 
before the Airport Authority's action had any substantial 
practical bite, the comparative benefit of better procedures 
at the administrative level was diminished. Under these 
circumstances, we hold that Eagle's procedural due process 
rights were not violated. This case dif fers greatly from the 
typical case in which only post-deprivation pr ocess is 
available. 
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Nor do we find a violation of Eagle's substantive due 
process rights. Eagle's briefs do not ar gue that the Airport 
Authority denied its application for a reason that is 
" `tainted by improper motives.' " Nicholas v. Pennsylvania 
State University, 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000)(citation 
omitted). Rather, Eagle contends that "[t]he Airport 
Authority's review was anything but car eful and 
considered," that its decision was contrary to 
"overwhelming evidence that the Happy Valley Landfill 
posed no safety threat to the Airport," that"the Airport 
Authority members were confused," and that they were 
unable to articulate a basis for their decision. Khodara 
Reply Br. at 13-15. Courts must exercise caution before 
recognizing substantive due process claims. See, e.g., 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998); 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271(1994); Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Nicholas, 227 
F.3d at 140; Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1994 (en banc). For purposes of discussion we 
will assume that Eagle's hoped-for use of its Happy Landing 
site as a landfill constituted a constitutionally protected 
property interest. With this as pr edicate, it would seem that 
Eagle's substantive due process challenge to the Airport 
Authority's denial of Eagle's application goes to the manner 
in which the Airport Authority arrived at its decision. The 
core of Eagle's complaint is the contention that the Airport 
Authority's decision was not rationally supported by 
substantial evidence. But precisely this contention could 
have been brought before a state court in the appellate 
review of the Airport Authority's decision whose availability, 
we have determined, satisfied the requirements of 
procedural due process. Under these cir cumstances, we 
conclude that the state court review which Eagle did not 
elect to pursue constituted sufficient protection of Eagle's 
asserted substantive due process rights. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Appeals No. 99-3458 and 99- 
3475 are dismissed as moot, and that portion of the 
District Court's judgment concerning the facial 
constitutionality of the 1996 Amendment is vacated. The 
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District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Airport Authority and its directors is affir med. The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. On remand, Eagle should be affor ded the 
opportunity to amend its pleadings so that the District 
Court may have the opportunity to address any claims 
regarding the 2000 Amendment. 
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